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THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
THE INVESTMENT ADVISER AND
THE MUTUAL FUND: TOO
CLOSE FOR COMFORT
1.

INTRODUCTION

Mutual funds have a unique corporate structure. Unlike conventional
corporations, almost all mutual funds are externally managed.' The mutual
fund generally contracts out the "principal management functions to a separate company, an investment adviser, which is paid an advisory fee, almost
always a percentage of the fund's net assets."'2 The principal function of the
investment adviser is portfolio management, but
often the adviser also
3
provides all administrative services for the fund.
Usually the people who organize mutual funds also act as the investment
adviser. 4 Often, these same people are elected to the board of directors of the
fund, enabling them to control the decisions of the fund. 5 "Hence, while the
fund and its adviser are theoretically two separate entities, with the fund
contracting out to the adviser for certain services, it is the adviser that
dominates the fund. ' 6 The conflicts of interest inherent in this relationship are
obvious, blending the duties of corporate directors, independent money
managers, and investment advisers. This consanguinity does not lend itself to
easy dissection or characterization, causing commentators to label it anomalous 7 and incestuous. 8 However, the kinship between the fund and the
1. SEC Report on the Public Policy Implications of Investment Company Growth, H.R. Rep.
No. 2337, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 45 (1966) [hereinafter cited as 1966 SEC Report].
2. Rottenberg, Developing Limits on Compensation of Mutual Fund Advisers, 7 Harv. J.
Legis. 309, 311 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Rottenbergi.
3. 1966 SEC Report, supra note 1, at 84-87, 90-91. "Since most mutual funds have no staffs
of their own, the non-advisory services they require are performed in varying degrees by their
investment advisers .... Id. at 90. A survey of 100 mutual funds to determine the extent to
which the advisers pay for non-advisory services revealed:
a) 88% of the advisers paid all the salaries and compensation of the fund's officers;
b) 85% of the advisers paid for the office rental;
c) 81% of the advisers paid for all the clerical and bookkeeping services. Id. at 91.
4. See, e.g., Rosenfeld v. Black, 445 F.2d 1337, 1338 (2d Cir. 1971), petition for cert.
dismissed, 409 U.S. 802 (1972); Galfand v. Chestnutt, 402 F. Supp. 1318, 1323 (S.D.N.Y. 197s).
5. "The investment adviser usually is well represented on the fund's board of directors and
maintains effective control over the fund." Hearings on S.1659, Before the Senate Comm. on
Banking and Currency, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 10 (1967) (Statement by Manuel F. Cohen,
Chairman, Securities and Exchange Commission) [hereinafter cited as 1967 Senate Hearingsl
Note, Mutual Fund Advisory Fees and the New Standard of Fiduciary Duty-Interpreting the
1970 Mutual Fund Act, 56 Cornell L. Rev. 627, 631 & n.25 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Cornell
Note]; see, e.g., Galfand v. Chestnutt, 402 F. Supp. 1318, 1324 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (five of the eight
members of the board of directors were affiliated with the investment adviser).
6. Cornell Note, supra note 5, at 631. "At the time of the Wharton study (1958-62), for
example, the Wharton Report found that 89% of the funds it studied, or 94.4% of all mutual fund
assets, were under the control of advisory groups with no substantial ownership interest in the
fund itself." Id. at 631-32 n.26.
7. Modesitt, The Mutual Fund-A Corporate Anomaly, 14 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 1252 (1967).
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investment adviser 9 has been recognized by both Congress' 0 and the courts'I
as fiduciary in nature. This recognition only opens the door to judicial
scrutiny. The obligations arising from the relationship and the consequences
flowing from a breach of the adviser's duties pose more intricate problems. 12
This Note will examine the nature of the fiduciary relationship between the
investment adviser and the mutual fund and assess standards 3 to be used in
determining whether the adviser has breached its obligations. It will then
discuss several problems stemming' 4 from this unique relationship and
analyze the effect of recent legislation adopted to solve these problems.
11.

FIDUCIARY DUTY AND ADVISORY CONTRACT FEE:

A

BUILT-IN CONFLICT OF INTEREST

Although not completely analogous, the fiduciary relationship between
mutual fund and adviser closely parallels that of a corporation and its
directors. 5 This is so since the adviser commonly exerts a dominant influence
on the fund's board and is often a member of such board. This analogy also
permits the advisory contract to be viewed as an interested director contract,
and brings into play the problems of corporations (the fund and the adviser)
with common directors. Finally, the adviser's fee can be scrutinized from the
standpoint of directors fixing their own compensation.
Generally, corporate fiduciary duties require no less than good faith and
fair dealing.' 6 The fiduciary duties of a corporate director are usually expressed in terms of a duty to exercise due care and a duty of individual loyalty
8. Pomerantz, Conference on Mutual Funds, 115 U. Penn. L. Rev. 669, 739 (1967); Note, The
Mutual Fund and its Management Company: An Analysis of Business Incest, 71 Yale L.J. 137
(1961).
9. There is an inherent conflict of interest in this relationship, especially in regard to the
advisory fee. Rottenberg, supra note 2, at 312.
10. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35 (a, b) (1970). "It is certainly not breaking any new legal ground to
state that the investment adviser . . . owes a fiduciary duty to the fund and to the public
shareholders who are the owners of the fund." 1967 Senate Hearings, supra note 5, at 10.
11. See, e.g., SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 191 (1963);
Rosenfeld v. Black, 445 F.2d 1337, 1342, 1348 (2d Cir. 1971), petition for cert. dismissed, 409
U.S. 802 (1972). "While a new § 36 (b) expressly declares that 'the investment adviser of a
registered investment company shall be deemed to have a fiduciary duty with respect to the
receipt of compensation for services, or of payments of a material nature, paid by such registered
investment company, or by the security holders thereof, to such investment adviser or any
affiliated person of such investment advisor,' the context makes plain that Congress did not mean
this to be the only fiduciary duty of investment advisers." Id. at 1348.
12. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 85-86 (1943).
13. See notes 42-68 infra and accompanying text.
14. See notes 77-103, 148-55 infra and accompanying text.
15. Cornell Note, supra note 5, at 641-42; see 1967 Senate Hearings, supra note 5, at 210
(statement by Senator McIntyre) (urged the use of corporate fiduciary principles in developing
standards for the mutual fund industry); SEC v. Insurance Sec., Inc., 254 F.2d 642, 650 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 823 (1958) (corporate fiduciary standards used to define investment
adviser's relationship to fund).
16. H. Henn, Law of Corporations § 235 (2d ed. 1970) [hereinafter cited as Hennl.
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to the corporate interest. Included in the concept of corporate loyalty is "a
duty to avoid conflicts of interest or self-dealing." 17 Directors owe a duty of
undivided loyalty"8 as their actions should only be influenced by considerations of the corporate welfare. 19 This principle prevents the fiduciary from
making a profit at the expense of the corporation. 20 Nevertheless, it has not
been so strictly applied
as to exclude all possibilities of personal gain or benefit
21
by the director.

When a director has a conflict of interest in a corporate transaction, there
has been a split of authority as to whether the contract is voidable. 22 The
more recent cases tend to apply a fairness test. 2 3 Given that a conflict of
interest exists, the inquiry involves whether "the transaction carries the
earmarks of an arm's length bargain, ' 24 and whether there is a reasonable
balance between the benefits and the burdens. 25 The director owes a duty of
full disclosure, since "[hie must give to the corporation . . . all the relevant and
material information he possesses or can obtain on the subject of the transac2 -7
'26

tion."

Such

transactions

are

subject

to

rigorous

judicial

scrutiny.

Whenever the fairness of a transaction involving a conflict of interest is
challenged the burden is usually placed upon those who seek to uphold the

transaction, 28 subject to state statutory schemes. 2 9

17. M. Feuer, Personal Liabilities of Corporate Officers and Directors 28 (Qd ed. 1974)
[hereinafter cited as Feuer].
18. Henn, supra note 16, § 236, Feuer, supra note 17, at 40. But cf. '[AI director or officer,
besides his corporate activities, has personal interests to advance. Hence, too strict an application
of the rule of undivided loyalty would tend to restrict freedom of enterprise and to discourage
competent men from serving ....
.. Henn, supra note 16, § 236 at 459-60.
19. Henn, supra note 16, § 236; Litwin v. Allen, 25 N.Y.S. 2d 667, 677 (Sup. Ct. 1940).
20. Vogel v. Lewis, 25 App. Div. 2d 212, 215 (1st Dep't 1966), aff'd, 19 N.Y.2d 589 (1967);
Litwin v. Allen, 25 N.Y.S. 2d at 685; Feuer, supra note 17, at 41; Henn, supra note 16, § 237 at
462.
21. Feuer, supra note 17, at 41.
22. A three way split exists. The contract has been held to be "voidable on the basis of the
conflicting interest alone, on the basis of the conflicting interest plus the additional element of
fraud or bad faith, or on the basis of the conflicting interest plus the additional factor of unfairness
to the corporation." Henn, supra note 16, § 238 at 466-67 (footnotes omitted).
23. See, e.g., Moran v. Edson, 493 F.2d 400, 405 (3d Cir. 1974); Murphy v. Washington
Am. League Baseball Club, Inc., 324 F.2d 394, 396 (D.C. Cir. 1963); Shelensky v. South
Parkway Bldg. Corp., 19 Ill. 2d 268, 283, 166 N.E.2d 793, 801-02 (1960); Voss Oil Co. v. Voss,
367 P.2d 977, 979 (Wyo. 1962).
24. Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 306-07 (1939).
25. Globe Woolen Co. v. Utica Gas & Elec. Co., 224 N.Y. 483, 490, 121 N.E. 378, 380
(1918).
26. Feuer, supra note 17, at 47.
27. Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 306 (1939); Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458. 464, 164
N.E. 545, 546-47 (1928).
28. Geddes v. Anaconda Copper Mining Co., 254 U.S. 590, 599 (1921). The burden of proof
has consistently been imposed upon the party seeking to enforce the transaction to show it was
fair. See, e.g., Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 306 (1939); Backus v. Finkelstein, 23 F.2d 357,
364 (D. Minn. 1927); Voss Oil Co. v. Voss, 367 P. 2d 977, 979 (Wyo. 1962); Henn, supra note 16,
§ 238, at 467; Feuer, supra note 17, at 43.

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45

The most apparent conflict of interest for the investment adviser involves
the determination of the advisory fee. 3 3 Both the Wharton Report 3 I and the
1966 SEC Report 32 on mutual funds indicated that tighter controls than were
originally included in the Investment Company Act of 194033 were needed to
protect the interests of the shareholders. 34 Early challenges to excessive
35
advisory fees, decided under either state or federal law, were unsuccessful.
The courts rejected the application of the traditional fairness test, and instead
treated the cases as ratification cases, 36 placing the burden on plaintiff to
prove that the fees were so excessive as to constitute waste of corporate
assets. 37 Plaintiff was required to show that the fees were so out'38of proportion
to the value of services rendered as to be "unconscionable.
In 1966, the SEC recommended that the standard of reasonableness should
be applied in advisory fee cases. 3 9 The mutual fund industry was opposed to
the enactment of an express standard of reasonableness 40 and succeeded in
29. See, e.g., Cal. Corp. Code § 820 (West 1955); N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 713 (McKinney
Supp. 1975).
30. Between 1959 and 1966 over 50 actions were commenced against investment advisers.
These suits involved mainly the advisory fee. 1966 SEC Report, supra note 1, at 132.
31. See Wharton School of Finance & Commerce, A Study of Mutual Funds, H.R. Rep. No.
2274, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962) [hereinafter cited as Wharton Report].
32. See note 1 supra.
33. Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to 52 (1970).
34. Wharton Report, supra note 31, at 33-34, 64; 1966 SEC report, supra note 1, at 75,
142-43.
35. Acampora v. Birkland, 220 F. Supp. 527 (D. Colo. 1963) (applying federal law); Saxe v.
Brady, 40 Del. Ch. 474, 184 A.2d 602 (1962) (applying state law); Meiselman v. Eberstadt, 39
Del. Ch. 563, 170 A.2d 720 (1961) (applying state law). These are the only fully litigated cases in
this area. The 1966 SEC report noted that "in most cases settlements were reached which
provided for some reduction in advisory fees to be charged in future years." 1966 SEC Report,
supra note 1, at 133. In each of the fully litigated cases it was "held that the plaintiffs had failed
to prove the fees legally excessive .... ." Id.
36. "When the stockholders ratify a transaction, the interested parties are relieved of the
burden of proving the fairness of the transaction. The burden then falls on the objecting
stockholders to convince the court that no person of ordinary, sound business judgment would be
expected to entertain the view that the consideration was a fair exchange for the value which was
given." Saxe v. Brady, 40 Del. Ch. 474, 481, 184 A.2d 602, 610 (1962).
37. Saxe v. Brady, 40 Del. Ch. 474, 481, 184 A.2d 602, 610 (1962); Acampora v. Birkland,
220 F. Supp. 527, 548-49 (D. Colo. 1963) (cites Saxe decision as controlling and places the burden
on the plaintiff to establish corporate waste).
38. Saxe v. Brady, 40 Del. Ch. 474, 481, 184 A.2d 602, 610, (1962); Acampora v. Birkland,
220 F. Supp. 527, 548-49 (D. Colo. 1963).
39. 1966 SEC Report, supra note 1, at 143-47. "[T]he standard of reasonableness [should] be
applied in the light of all relevant factors, including the fees paid for comparable services by other
financial institutions ... ; the nature and quality of the services provided; all benefits directly or
indirectly received by persons affiliated with an investment company and their affiliated persons
by virtue of their relationship with an investment company . . . . " Id. at 144.
40. 1967 Senate Hearings, supra note 5, at 192 (Statement on Behalf of the Investment
Company Institute, Joseph E. Welch, Member of Executive Committee and Chairman of Federal
Legislation Committee). "We agree, of course, that management fees should be reasonable. We
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blocking passage of the bill. 41 Four years later, Congress enacted the Investment Company Amendments Act of 1970,42 which provided that "the investment adviser of a registered investment company shall be deemed to have a
fiduciary duty with respect to the receipt of compensation . .. . 3
Under this Act it became clear that advisory fee cases would not be treated
as ratification cases, 44 but rather as fiduciary cases involving a conflict of
interest.45 While the traditional common law approach to cases involving
conflicts of interest and abuses of fiduciary relationships was to place the
burden of demonstrating the fairness of the transaction 46 on the investment
adviser, section 35(b)(1) appears to impose the burden of proving a breach of
47
fiduciary duty on the plaintiff.
It has been argued that the statute does not have to be construed so as to
place the burden on plaintiff to establish that the transaction is unfair by a
clear preponderance of the evidence. 48 Instead, the courts could use the same
approach taken in some corporate fiduciary cases. 49 Plaintiff would have a
duty to state a prima facie case demonstrating some unfairness, at which
point the burden would shift to defendant to demonstrate the fairness of the
transaction . 5 This would appear to be the better construction of the rule. If
the courts reject this interpretation and place the full burden on the plaintiff,
the effectiveness of this section to protect the rights of shareholders will be
believe they are reasonable and will continue to be so. Why, then, are we opposed to this SEC
proposal? We are opposed, first, because we believe it is unnecessary and, secondly, because it is
dangerous not only to our industry but to the investing public whom we serve ...
." Id.
41. See 3 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 4899-903 (1970) [hereinafter cited as 1970 News).
42. Act of Dec. 14, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-547, 84 Stat. 1413, amending 15 U.S.C. § 80a
(1970).
43. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(b) (1970), as amended by Act of Dec. 14, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-547,
84 Stat. 1413.
44. Id. § 80a-35b(2) (1970), as amended by Act of Dec. 14, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-547, 84
Stat. 1413. "In any such action approval by the board of directors of such investment company of
such compensation or payments, or of contracts or other arrangements providing for such
compensation or payments, and ratification or approval of such compensation or payments,
or of contracts or other arrangements providing for such compensation or payments, by the
shareholders of such investment company, shall be given such consideration by the court as is
deemed appropriate under all the circumstances." Id.
45. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(b) (1970), as amended by Act of Dec. 14, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-547, 84
Stat. 1413; Galfand v. Chestnutt, 402 F. Supp. 1318, 1325-26, 1328 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
46. See notes 22-29 supra and accompanying text.
47. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(b), as amended by Act of Dec. 14, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-547, 84 Star
1413. "It shall not be necessary to allege or prove that any defendant engaged in personal
misconduct, and the plaintiff shall have the burden of proving a breach of fiduciary duty." Id.
48. Cornell Note, supra note 5, at 645.
49. Mayflower Hotel Stockholders Protective Comm. v. Mayflower Hotel Corp., 73 F. Supp.
721 (D.D.C. 1947), rev'd, 173 F.2d 416 (D.C. Cir. 1949); Hackley v. Oltz, 105 So. 2d 20 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1958); Baker v. Cohn, 42 N.Y.S.2d 159, 166 (Sup. CL 1942), modified and aff'd,
266 App. Div. 715, 40 N.V.S.2d 623 (1st Dep't 1943), aff'd mem., 292 N.Y. 570, 54 N.E.2d 689
(1944).
50. Cornell Note, supra note 5, at 647.
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diminished. Plaintiff would usually be unable to meet this higher burden of
proof and therefore could not effectively challenge the contract between the
fund and the investment adviser. It was the difficult, almost impossible,
standard established in the earlier cases"1 that prompted Congress to enact the
new section 35. However, it appears that the courts will place a heavier
burden on 52plaintiff than the mere establishment of a prima facie case of
unfairness.
Section 35 does not indicate what factors are to be used in determining the
fairness of the transaction. Section 35 (b)(2) provides only that approval by the
board of directors or ratification by the shareholders should be given such
consideration as is deemed appropriate. In light of the control that the
investment adviser has over the board of directors and the proxy machinery,
-3
it is unlikely that the courts will give this factor much weight.
The legislative history indicates that when an action is brought for breach
of fiduciary duty against the investment adviser regarding compensation
received by him the court should look at all facts, including all services
rendered to the fund, all compensation received, and the compensation paid
54
by other mutual funds for similar services.
To ensure that the negotiations between the fund and the adviser are fair
and approximate arm's-length negotiations, the investment adviser has a duty
to disclose all relevant information." Failure to disclose such information will
6
be strong evidence of a breach of fiduciary duty.1
51. See notes 33-36 supra and accompanying text.
52. In Galfand v. Chestnutt, 402 F. Supp. 1318 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), the court does not clearly
state which party has the burden of proof. The court cited the traditional corporate fiduciary
cases, stating that "[s]uch transactions will be upheld only if, after subjecting them to rigid
judicial scrutiny, they are found to be fair." Id. at 1328. In all these cited cases, the burden was
on the party seeking to sustain the transaction. See note 28 supra and accompanying text. The
court also cited Rosenfeld v. Black, 445 F.2d 1337 (2d Cir. 1971), petition for cert. dismissed, 409
U.S. 802 (1972). Rosenfeld dealt with another aspect of breach of fiduciary relationship by the
investment adviser. 402 F. Supp. at 1328. However, in Rosenfeld the burden was on the
defendant to demonstrate the fairness of the transaction.
Though Galfand does not speak in terms of burden of proof, it appears to take a middle
position between requiring plaintiff to show a breach of fiduciary duty by a clear preponderance
of the evidence and the prima facie standard suggested. 402 F. Supp. at 1326. But see 3 U.S.
Code Cong. & Ad. News 4910 (1970). "The section makes it explicit that . , . plaintiff has the
burden of proving to the satisfaction of the court that the defendant has committed a breach of
fiduciary duty." Id.
53. See notes 4-6 supra and accompanying text; Galfand v. Chestnutt, 402 F. Supp. 1318,
1328 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (ratification of the advisory contract by the board without the benefit of full
disclosure, was the basis on which the court found a breach of fiduciary duty).
54. 3 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 4910 (1970).
55. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-15(c) (1970). "[Tjhe bill requires the investment adviser to furnish to the
directors information reasonably necessary to evaluate the management contract .... .. 1970
News, supra note 41, at 4910.
56. Galfand v. Chestnutt, 402 F. Supp. 1318, 1324-29 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). The failure of the
investment adviser to present to the Board of Directors all relevant information, including the
financial position of the investment adviser, the decrease in value of the stock portfolio, and
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In evaluating the fairness of the transaction, the court can look to see if the
"'deliberations of the directors were a matter of substance or a mere formality.' ,,S7 The directors must evaluate both the benefits and the burdens to the
fund,58 for the absence of such deliberation will be evidence that the transaction was unfair and therefore voidable by the court.5 9 However, the court is
not authorized "to substitute its business judgement for that'60of the mutual
fund's board of directors in the area of management fees."
The court in determining the fairness of the advisory fee, should take into
consideration the size of the mutual fund and the growth of the net assets of
the fund. 6 ' The advisory fee is usually related to the net assets of the fund, so
that as the assets increase so does the advisory fee. "It is generally recognized,
however, that increases in the assets of a fund do not lead to a commensurate
increase in the cost of furnishing it with investment advice and other
managerial services."'62 However, most advisory fees do not decline proportionally as net assets increase. 63 A failure by the investment adviser to inform
the board of directors of the proportional decrease in cost that occurs when
net assets rise could possibly be grounds for finding a breach of fiduciary duty.
In determining whether costs are fair, the courts may also wish to consider
the expense of providing similar services by an internally managed mutual
fund. Though internally managed funds are the exception in the mutual fund
industry, 64 an analysis of their costs shows that their management fees are
significantly lower than those incurred by externally managed funds.6 5 Howdetailed description of increased cost was the basis on which the court found the advisory
contract to be unenforceable.
57. Galfand v. Chestnutt, 402 F. Supp. 1318, 1326 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). "The desire to improve
[the investment adviser's] profits was, perhaps, not 'improper motivation' of the interested
directors here, but to do so without full disclosure and discussion of [the investment adviser's]
financial condition . . . was inappropriate." Id. at 1328.
58. See note 25 supra and accompanying text.
59. Galfand v. Chestnutt, 402 F. Supp. 1318, 1326-28 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). The failure of the
board to consider the relation between the benefit received by the fund and the increased burden
imposed by the higher advisory fee was strong indication that the transaction did not have the
characteristics of arm's length negotiation. There was some evidence that the investment adviser
offered a unique service and that his rising cost threatened his business, but the court concluded
that this contention was unsupported. Id. at 1327-28.
60. 1970 News, supra note 41, at 4902.
61. See note 2 supra and accompanying text.
62. 1966 SEC Report, supra note 1, at 94. "It is now almost axiomatic in the trust business
that operating costs decline proportionately as the size of a trust increases." Id. (testimony of M.
Griswold).
63. Id. at 97-98.
64. Id. at 102.
65. Id. at 103-08. Both of these factors, decrease in costs due to increase in net assets and
comparing costs of internally managed funds, were suggested by the SEC as part of the
"reasonableness test" in the 1967 legislative recommendation. Congress, however, did not adopt
the reasonableness test, but instead enacted a standard based on fiduciary principles. The SEC
stated its opinion that the fiduciary standard was an "even more effective method than its original
proposal to test the reasonableness of mutual fund management fees." SEC Memorandum on
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ever, use of this comparison might suggest that most external management
fees are excessive. Finally, the courts could consider the relative performance
of the stock portfolio as compared to the performance of other mutual fund
66

portfolios.

Conscientious judicial attention to these factors may well be the only
protection afforded to mutual fund shareholders in a marketplace which lacks
the competitive forces necessary to achieve the same protection. "Such
competitive forces

. . .

have not in fact existed in the mutual fund industry

with respect to advisory fees. Instead, a sellers' market exists in which the
investment adviser wearing one hat, sets his own fee, and wearing his other
hat collects it ...
In the absence of competition or arm's-length bargaining, the basic
'67
fiduciary obligation of fairness must serve as an effective substitute.
Ill.

SALE OF THE INVESTMENT ADVISER

Another frequently litigated area connected with mutual funds concerns the
impact of the fiduciary relationship when the person who controls the
investment adviser sells or transfers his interest. The problem arises when the
compensation the adviser receives exceeds the book value of the assets of the
management organization. 68 The higher price is paid to the adviser because of
69
his ability to ensure that the fund will engage the new adviser.
The acceptance of these succession fees creates a potential conflict of
interest for the investment adviser; while he has an interest in obtaining the
highest price for himself, he also has a duty to the mutual fund to select the
70
best available management successor.
The Investment Company Act of 1940 provided that the adviser's contract
is automatically terminated if assigned. 7' Therefore any contract between the
H.R. 11995, Hearings on H.R. 11995 Before the Subcomm. on Commerce and Finance of the
House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 91-33, pt. 1 at
138-39 (1969). Therefore, the use of these standards should be appropriate under the fairness test.
66. This comparison was suggested in Cornell Note, supra note 5, at 650. By employing this
comparison, the negotiations between the adviser and the fund would more closely approximate
arm's length negotiations. This would encourage a competitive element which has been conspicuously missing in the mutual fund industry.
67. 1967 Senate Hearings, supra note 5, at 10.
68. "While the management organization may have some tangible assets, by far its most
valuable asset is its control of the fund." 1966 SEC Report, supra note 1, at 149.
69. "The prices paid in these transactions invariably reflect an expectation that the buyers
will be able to succeed to the sellers' control relationship with the fund. These prices usually have
been far in excess of book value of the property transferred and represent a capitalization of
anticipated future earnings that can be realized only from the continuance of that relationship."
Id. at 150-51.
70. See 1966 SEC Report, supra note 1, at 14, 151. See also Note, Fiduciary Requirements
and the Succession Fee Upon the Change of Mutual Fund Advisers, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 655, 656
(1972).
71. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-15(a)(4) (1970).
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new adviser and the fund would have to be approved by the shareholders,7
theoretically providing them with direct protection of their interest. In practice, however, the outgoing adviser usually dominates the board of directors
of the fund and controls the proxy machinery. He is 73
thus routinely able to
assure approval of his successor by the stockholders.
When a profit is made from the sale of the adviser, the problem arises as to
whether it is the outgoing adviser or the fund that is entitled to the profit. As
a fiduciary, the fund may be entitled to all profits from the sale of the
fiduciary office. 74 However, since it was the investment adviser who organized the fund and took the initial risks,7 5 he would seemingly be entitled to
receive compensation for his entrepreneurial skills in successfully organizing
the fund. 76 This problem has been considered in litigation and in new federal
legislation.
In SEC v. Insurance Securities, Inc.,7 7 the court rejected the contention
that sale of the investment adviser, in excess of book value, constituted "gross
misconduct" and "gross abuse of trust, ' 78 thus rejecting the allegation that the
sale involved a breach of fiduciary duty. 79 Though the court recognized that a
fiduciary cannot profit from the sale of his office,80 this principle was deemed
inapplicable because, under 15 U.S.C. § 80a-15(a)(4) the shift in control of
the investment adviser automatically terminated the service contract. 8'
Therefore, the profits received could not be said to represent compensation for
the sale of fiduciary office. 8 2 The only protection that Congress intended was
approval by the stockholders of any subsequent contract.8 3
72. Id. § 80a-15(a).
73. "In the Commission's experience, shareholder approval of a sale of management organiza.
tion has been readily obtained. The Commission knows of no instance where fund shareholders
have rejected a new advisory contract proposed by their managers in connection with a sale by
them of the management organization." 1966 SEC Report, supra note 1, at 150.
74. Under basic fiduciary principles all profits from the sale of fiduciary office goes to the
cestui qui trust. See Rosenfeld v. Black, 445 F.2d 1337, 1343 (2d Cir. 1971).
75. Hearings on S.249 Before Subcomm. on Securities of the Comm. on Banking, Housing, and
Urban Affairs, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 373 (1975) (Statement by Robert L. Augenblick, President
of Investment Company Institute) [hereinafter cited as 1975 Hearings].
76. Unlike corporations, the fund may not offer shares of the fund to the investment adviser
at a discount in compensation for services rendered. 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-22(g), 80b-5(l) (1970).
77. 254 F.2d 642 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 823 (1958).
78. Id.at 651.
79. Id.at 650.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. The decision was criticized by the SEC in its 1966 Report on Public Policy
Implications of Investment Company Growth. "However unrealistic this conclusion may appear
in the light of the ability of the retiring management to use the proxy machinery to insure the
installation of its self-chosen successors, application of the strict common-law principle might well
be unfair insofar as it denies to the retiring management any compensation for the elements of
value in the relationship which they may have built up over the years." 1966 SEC Report, supra
note 1, at 152.
83. 254 F.2d at 651.
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Thirteen years later, in Rosenfeld v. Black,8 4 the Second Circuit held that
realizing profits as a result of the transfer of the investment adviser was a
breach of fiduciary duty.8 5 The court found that the sale of control of the
investment adviser came within the well-established equitable principle8 6 that
a fiduciary may not sell or transfer such an office for personal gain. 8 7 Further,
the ratification by the stockholders will "not save a fiduciary from accountability ... *"88 The court rejected the contention that section 1589 was the only
protection envisioned by Congress.9" "The purpose of § 15 was to furnish the
added protection of approval of a new adviser by a majority of the stockholders, not to withdraw safeguards already afforded by equity." 9 1
In distinguishing Insurance Securities, the court pointed to a change in
section 36 since that earlier decision. 92 The new standard was based on
fiduciary duty, not on a "gross abuse of trust. '93 Finally the court, after
examining the legislative history, refused to endorse the contention that
Congress intended an investment adviser to profit from the sale of his
advisory position. 9 4 The practical result of Rosenfeld was to create uncertainty as to the proper distribution of funds from the sale of the investment
adviser. The decision was criticized for depriving the owner of the investment
adviser of any possible gain from the organization of new mutual funds. 95
After the Rosenfeld decision, "lawsuits were brought attacking at least 22
transactions involving the sale of substantial interest[s] in management companies.1 96 Few of the lawsuits were ever fully litigated-many were
settled 97-though some of these decisions indicated in dictum that Roseitfeld
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

445 F.2d 1337 (2d Cir. 1971).
Id. at 1342-43.
Id. at 1342.

90.

445 F.2d at 1344.

91.
92.
93.

Id. at 1344-45 (footnote omitted).
Id. at 1345-46 n.12.
Id. at 1346-48.

Id.
Id. at 1343.
15 U.S.C. § 80a-15 (1970).

94. Id. at 1347-48. On remand the court approved a settlement in which the adviser would
pay one million dollars for the release of all claims. 336 F. Supp. 84 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). The court
found that the maximum recovery for plaintiff, if successful, would have been three million
dollars. Id. at 90. In determining the reasonableness of the settlement, the court looked to "the
strength of the case for plaintiffs on the merits, balanced against the amount offered In
settlement." Id. at 87. Therefore, the court found the million dollar settlement was reasonable. Id.

at 90.
95. Markham, The Sale of Advisory Contracts-Rosenfeld v. Black, 19 N.Y.L.F. 61, 74,
81-82 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Markham); 1975 Hearings, supra note 75, at 371; statement by
SEC Chairman, N.Y. Times, Sept. 12, 1971, at 3, col. 1, cited in Newman v. Stein, 464 F.2d
689, 695 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1039 (1972).
96. 1975 Hearings, supra note 75, at 372.
97. Id.; see, e.g., Newman v. Stein, 464 F.2d 689 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1039
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was controlling law. 98 A few courts have rejected the rationale of the
Rosenfeld
decision, on the ground that it misinterpreted Congressional in9
tent.

9

Section 28 of the Securities Acts Amendments of 1975100 amended section
15 of the Investment Company Act of 1940.101 It clarifies the law in light of
Rosenfeld °2 by removing the uncertainty surrounding the transfer of the
investment adviser. 0 3 The amendment makes clear that an investment
adviser can make a profit on the sale of its business provided certain
conditions are met.' 04 "These conditions are designed to prevent any unfair
burden from being imposed on the investment company in connection with
such a transaction."' 05
The new section 15(f)(1) provides that an investment adviser 0 6 may
receive any amount or benefit from the sale of securities or other business
interest which results in an assignment of the advisory contract with the
investment company, provided two conditions are met. 10 It is the assign(1972) (court approved a settlement for $5 million where potential recovery was $3S million);
Marcus v. Putnam, 60 F.R.D. 441 (D. Mass. 1973) (court, citing Rosenfeld as controlling,
approved a settlement of $3.29 million as reasonable where plaintiff had sued for $28 million in
profits made in sale of Old Management Co.); White v. Auerbach, (1972-1973 Transfer Binder]
CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
93,617 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
98. See, e.g., Gordon v. Fundamental Investors, Inc., 362 F. Supp. 41 (S.D.N.Y. 1973)
(cited Rosenfeld as controlling, but dismissed action because it was brought as a class action and
not as a derivative suit); King v. Kansas City S. Indus., Inc., 56 F.R.D. 96 (N.D. i1. 1972),
aff'd, 519 F.2d 20 (7th Cir. 1975) (cited Rosenfeld, but denied class action status, because action
must be brought as derivative suit).
99. Kukman v. Baum, 346 F. Supp. 55 (N.D. Ill. 1972). The court held that Rosenfeld had
misinterpreted the legislative intent and that Congress had not decided to overrule the Insurance
Securities case. If Rosenfeld were followed, " '[o]wers of stock of a management company who
have built up the value of their shares through the years by the exercise of business ability and
good judgment are forbidden ever to reap the reward of their labor. In other words, they can
never sell the shares for what they are really worth. This conclusion offends one's sense of
fairness. If overriding considerations of public policy requires [sic] a curb on the right of owners
of management contracts to realize the full value of their assets, it is for Congress to say so.' "Id.
at 65, quoting Krieger v. Anderson, 40 Del. Ch. 363, 366, 182 A.2d 907, 910 (1962). An
unreported case also rejected Rosenfeld. Vanderbilt Mut. Fund v. Jones (S.D. Cal., Aug. 29,
1972) (cited in 1975 Hearings, supra note 75, at 371 n.5.); see also Schlusselberg v. Colonial
Management Assoc. Inc., 389 F. Supp. 733, 739-40 (D. Mass. 1974).
100. 15 U.S.C.A. § 80a-15 (Supp. 1976).
101. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-15 (1970).
102. See notes 84-94 supra and accompanying text.
103. 1 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 249 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Legislative History).
104. Id.
105. 4 CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 48,330 at 37,147 (1975) [hereinafter cited as CCH Annot.].
106. Investment adviser is defined in 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(20) (1970). Because of the special
nature of an investment company, corporate trustees are excluded from the definition. Therefore
section (f)(1) specifically names corporate trustees to be covered by the section.
107. 15 U.S.C.A. § 80a-15(O (Supp. 1976).
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ment'0 8 of the advisory contract that triggers the protection of this section. 109
The first condition is that for three years after the transfer at least 75 percent
of the board of directors" 0 of the investment company must not be interested''' in either the new or outgoing investment adviser.'' 2 The purpose
of this provision is to insulate the board from the control of the investment
adviser." 3 The advisory contract must be renewed every year, 1 4 so that
when the initial contract of the new adviser expires, the board will be
independent and able to make an arm's-length decision on whether to
continue with the same investment adviser. 15 To ensure the independence of
the board of directors, section 16 of the Investment Company Act of 1940'16
was also amended as to the procedure for filling vacancies on the board of
directors. The section provides that when such a vacancy occurs, 17 and must
be filled by a non-interested person, that person must be selected and
proposed for election by a majority of directors not interested in the investment adviser and the new director must be elected by the holders of
outstanding voting securities. 1 8 The obvious purpose of this section is to
ensure that the new director, even though non-interested in the investment
adviser, is also not under its influence.
The second condition is that no unfair burden to the investment company
may occur as a result of the transaction. 1 9 The Act provides that an unfair
burden includes any arrangement for compensation, within two years after

108. "[A]ny direct or indirect transfer or hypothecation of a contract or chose in action by the
assignor, or of a controlling block of the assignor's outstanding voting securities by a security
holder of the assignor ....
15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(4) (1970). "As assignment ordinarily occurs as a
result of a transfer of a controlling block of the adviser's or corporate trustee's stock, but, as
indicated by the definition, it may also be accomplished indirectly by a sale of assets or other
means." Legislative History, supra note 103, at 318.
109. Legislative History, supra note 103, at 317-18.
110. The rule is different when a corporate trustee is involved. See Legislative History, supra
note 103, at 317-18.
111. The term "interested person" is defined in 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(19) (1970). This definition
is referred to in the new section (0(2). Normally 60 percent of the board of directors are permitted
to be interested in the investment adviser. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-10(a) (1970). However an open-ended,
no-load fund may have a board of directors where all members except one are interested in the
investment adviser. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-10(d) (1970).
112. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-15 (1970), as amended 15 U.S.C.A. § 80a-15(0(1)(A) (Supp. 1976).
113. The initial SEC proposal was to have a five year period, but this section of the bill was
amended by a bill proposed by Senator Williams. See Markham, supra note 95, at 76-79.
114. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-15(a)(2) (1970).
115. It was suggested that an even better solution to the problem would be to require the
board not only to be independent for two years after the transfer, but also to be composed of
members of which 75 percent are uninterested in the investment adviser six months before the
new advisory contract is approved. Sterrett, Reward for Mutual Fund Sponsor Entrepreneurial
Risk, 58 Cornell L. Rev. 195, 256 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Sterrett).
116. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-16 (1970).
117. See notes 104-109 supra and accompanying text.
118. 15 U.S.C.A. § 80a-16(b) (Supp. 1976); see Sterrett, supra note 115, at 252-53.
119. 15 U.S.C.A. § 80a-15(0(1)(B) (Supp. 1976).
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the transaction occurs, in which the investment adviser receives or is entitled
to receive direct or indirect compensation from the sale of securities or
property either to, from, or on behalf of the company.' 20 This does not
include bona fide ordinary compensation received as principal underwriter or
compensation for bona fide investment advisory or other services.' 2' "Such a
burden could arise, for example where the transaction involves an arrangement entitling an interested person of an investment adviser to receive
brokerage commissions for executing the investment company's portfolio
22
transactions."1

This unfair burden provision is similar to one suggested by the SEC in
1966.123 Under the original provision, liability would result upon a showing of
a likelihood of harm. 124 In the new legislation, there would seem to be a less
stringent standard, since liability attaches when an unfair burden is imposed.
25
The standard in the 1966 SEC recommendation was "additional burdens"'
while the new standard is "unfair burden." It has been suggested that this
evidenced the Congressional belief "that certain types of burdens caused
by a
26
change in advisers should be borne by mutual fund shareholders."'
To protect the funds further from the negative effect of such a transaction,
Congress amended section 15. The new section now makes it unlawful for the
board of directors of the investment company, in connection with its evaluation of the terms of the advisory contract, to consider the purchase price
which the incoming adviser has paid.' 27 Its clear purpose is to prevent the
adviser from attempting to recoup part of his succession fee by obtaining a
higher management fee.
The bill also provides for a number of situations where the 75 percent rule
is inapplicable. 128 "[W]here the successor investment adviser has under management a substantially larger amount of assets than its predecessor adviser,
the Commission must take the discrepancy in size of assets into consideration
in determining whether or to what extent an application for exemption from
the requirements of subsection
15(f)(1)(A), 75 percent disinterested directors,
29

should be granted.'

The same provision is used when the transfer of the adviser results from a
merger or other consolidation of investment advisers with substantial dis120.

15 U.S.C.A. § 80a-15(f)(2)(B) (Supp. 1976).

121.

Legislative History, supra note 103, at 319.
122. Id. at 318.

123. 1966 SEC Report, supra note 1, at 152-53.
124. See Sterrett, supra note 115, at 263. He suggests that a court, presented with a sales
agreement which was "likely to harm" the investment company, could find liability.
125. 1966 SEC Report, supra note 1, at 152.
126. Sterrett, supra note 115, at 263. Sterrett also suggests that the changing from "burdens"
to "burden" "may indicate that the fairness of the transaction is to be judged on the basis of its
overall effect, permitting burdens to be offset by benefits ....
" Id. at 264.
127. 15 U.S.C.A. § 80a-15(c) (Supp. 1976).
128. See notes 110-12 supra and accompanying text.
129. CCH Annot., supra note 105,
48,330, at 37,148, commenting on 15 U.S.C.A.
§ 80a-15(f)(3) (Supp. 1976).

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45

crepancies in assets. 130 The purpose of these sections is "to permit the

Commission to deal flexibly with situations in which the requirements of
subsection (f)(1)(A) might pose an unnecessary obstacle to the completion of a

transfer of a small investment company management or organization to a
substantially larger one.''

Finally, section 15(f)(1)(A) does not apply when the transfer of the adviser
results either (i) from selling the stock to the public-provided there is32no
change in the identity of the person who controls the investment adviser1 or, (ii) from transferring to a person affiliated with the adviser-provided that
the transferee is a natural person who owned in aggregate more than 25
percent of the voting securities for a period of six months prior to the

transfer. 133 The motivation behind this section is to differentiate situations in
which there is a new adviser from those in which there is a transfer of

ownership of a continuing adviser.'

34

The restriction of placing no "unfair

burden" on the fund is still appropriate in those situations which are excepted
or partially excepted from the 75 percent rule. 135
IV.

BROKERAGE

COMMISSIONS:

GIVE-UPS

To

PAY-UPs

The external management structure of mutual funds has also given rise to
litigation involving the use of brokerage dollars paid directly by the mutual
fund, for research costs of the investment adviser. Prior to May 1975,

brokerage commissions charged for executing transactions were governed by a

minimum commission rate schedule.' 36 This commission was based on a
certain percentage of the price of the stock.' 3 7 These fixed-commission
rates' 38 "failed to take any account of the economies of scale in executing
large transactions. 1 39 The result was that a broker executing a large volume
transaction could make "a profit on substantially less than the minimum
commission rate.' 140 This created a situation where brokers who were com-

130. 15 U.S.C.A. § 80a-15(O(3)(B) (Supp. 1976).
48,330, at 37,148.
131. CCH Annot., supra note 105,
132. 15 U.S.C.A. § 80a-15(f)(4)(A) (Supp. 1976).
133. 15 U.S.C.A. § 80a-15(O(4)(B) (Supp. 1976).
134. This distinction was first suggested in an attempt to limit the scope of the Rosenfeld
decision. It was argued that Rosenfeld only "involved a succession by a new investment adviser . . . ." 1975 Hearings, supra note 75, at 372 (emphasis omitted).
48,330.
135. CCH Annot., supra note 105,
136. 1966 SEC Report, supra note 1, at 156.
137. The minimum commission on a sale of 10,000 shares of a particular stock was 100 times
the minimum commission on the sale of 100 shares of the same stock, assuming that the price per
share is the same. See Note, The Use of Brokerage Commissions to Promote Mutual Fund Sales:
Time to Give Up the "Give-Up", 68 Colum. L. Rev. 334, 336 (1968) [hereinafter cited as
Give-Up].
138. "In December 1968, the NYSE altered the commission schedule to allow a volume
discount on transactions in excess of 1,000 shares. However, the volume discount was not large
enough to fully reflect the economies of scale." Legislative History, supra note 103, at 239.
139. Id.
140. Give-Up, supra note 137, at 336.
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peting for mutual fund execution were willing to "give-up"' ' part of their
commission14 3to other brokers, 14 2 as provided for by the rules of various
exchanges.

The practice was for the investment adviser to use the give-up dollars to
stimulate sales' 44 of shares of the fund and to obtain additional research
information. 145 The adviser would direct the give-up to brokers who qualified
under exchange rules and provided necessary services, either sales or research, even though the services were not connected with the particular
execution. The potential for abusing the customer-directed give-up was
apparent, and the SEC recommended in 1966 that the practice be discontinued. 146 However, the practice lasted until 1975, although it was attacked
47

in litigation.

1

In Moses v. Burgin,148 a shareholder of a mutual fund brought an action
claiming that the fund could recapture a portion of the commissions given-up,
thus reducing the brokerage cost to the fund and that the failure to do so was
a breach of fiduciary duty. 149 Defendants contended that even if recapture
were practical, "the directors still had a right to choose between recapture of
the give-ups for [the] Fund's direct benefit, and awarding them to brokers for
its indirect benefit. [The court held], however, that if recovery was freely
available to [the] Fund, the directors had no such choice."' 50 The court found
that the fund could possibly have recovered the give-ups, 5 1 and the failure to
141. "A broker who surrenders a portion of his commission to another issaid to 'give up' the
surrendered portion. 'Give-ups' are of two kinds. One kind, the traditional correspondent
relationship, involves a division of compensation where there has been an actual division of labor
among two or more brokers in the handling of a particular transaction." 1966 SEC Report, supra
note 1, at 169. "The other kind of give-up is directed by the customer rather than arranged by the
executing broker and is paid to a broker who has nothing to do with the transaction. In the
typical customer-directed give-up, the customer places an order with a broker on condition that
even though he will handle the entire transaction he will pay cash amounting to a portion of his
commission to one or more other brokers ...." Id. at 170. In this Note, "give-up" will refer to a
customer directed "give-up," which was extensively used by the funds.
142. The percentage that the broker was willing to "give-up" was usually between 50-70
percent of his total commission. 1966 SEC Report, supra note 1, at 170; Give-Up, supra note 137,
at 336.
143. The NYSE rule generally provided that the give-up could only be directed to other
NYSE brokers. Regional exchange rules provided that a give-up could be distributed to any
broker who qualified under NASD rules. 1966 SEC Report, supra note 1, at 170-71.
144. 1966 SEC Report, supra note 1, at 164-65; Give-Up, supra note 137, at 337-38.
145. 1966 SEC Report, supra note 1, at 164.
146. Id. at 185-86.
147. The NYSE abolished the practice in 1968. However, it lasted in some form on other
regional exchanges until 1975. Fogel v. Chestnutt, 383 F. Supp. 914, 918 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), rev'd,
533 F.2d 731 (2d Cir. 1975).
148. 445 F.2d 369 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 994 (1971).
149. Id.at 371.
150. 445 F.2d at 374.
151. Id. at 375-76. In this case the investment adviser also had a wholly owned subsidiary
that was an underwriter. The underwriter could qualify under NASD or as a broker, and
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fully disclose
this possibility to the disinterested directors was grounds for
52
liability. 1
In Fogel v. Chestnutt,15 3 a similar action was brought for the failure to
recapture broker give-ups. The district court accepted the principle "that
defendants were under a duty by all proper means to secure for Fund the
return of excess brokerage commissions. It [was] not shown [however] that
defendants could have properly secured any return for Fund.' 5 4 The court
recognized the conflict of interest created by using give-ups to stimulate sales.
The fund's dollars were used to stimulate sales by directing the excess
commission dollars to brokers who had rendered sales services, This resulted
in higher fees for the adviser because the sales increased the net assets of the
fund. The court found, however, that this practice did not harm the
fund,
55
because under no circumstances could the fund secure a rebate.
156
After concluding that recapture 'of give-ups was against public policy,
the court stated that "[c]ivil liability can scarcely be imposed for failing to do
what it would have been contrary to public policy for the defendants to
do.' 57 Finally, it was found that defendants had fully disclosed the use of
give-ups,' 5s and therefore had not breached their fiduciary duty.
The Second Circuit reversed this decision.' 5 9 The court recognized that the
"investment adviser is 'under a duty of full disclosure of information to ...
unaffiliated directors in every area where there was even a possible conflict of

interest between their interests and the interests of the fund.

.... '",160

The

information supplied must be " 'effective' " in informing the disinterested
director of the possible alternatives.' 6' The court held that although there was
some discussion of the possibility of recapture of give-ups, this did not
constitute effective communication of the problem.162 The court rejected
defendant's contention that liability should not be imposed because the course
chosen was based on reasonable business judgment and most probably would
have been followed even with full disclosure. 63 The court went on to state,
therefore could qualify for "give-ups" on the regional exchanges. The "give-up" directed to the
underwriter could be used to decrease the fund's operating expense.
152.
153.
154.

Id. at 377-79, 384.
383 F. Supp. 914 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), rev'd, 533 F.2d 731 (2d Cir. 1975).
383 F. Supp. at 920.

155. Id.at 917.
156. The court cited various proposals by the NYSE and the SEC to eliminate "give-ups." Id.
at 918.
157.
Id. at 921.

158. Id. at 919. The court also went on to distinguish the Moses decision on the grounds that
Moses was decided before the SEC proposal was adopted and also the factual situation of the
defendants was different. In Moses, defendants' control of the underwriter provided a practical
means of recapture. Id. at 921.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.

Fogel v. Chestnutt, 533 F.2d 731 (2d Cir. 1975).
Id. at 745.
Id. at 745 n.13.
Id. at 747-49.
Id. at 750.
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however, that if recapture was impossible or illegal then there would be no
liability. 1 64 The court rejected the district court's findings and held that
recapture of some brokerage commissions was possible either through membership, by the adviser or affiliate, in either the National Association
of
1 6
Security Dealers or the Philadelphia-Baltimore-Washington Exchange. - Finally, the court found that the recapture of give-ups did not violate the
66
anti-rebate rules and therefore was not illegal.'
The recapture of give-ups has become a less important question as various
67
exchanges have changed their rules to limit customer-directed give-ups.
The later court decisions have been concerned more with the question of full
disclosure. If the adviser informed the board of directors
of the business
168
alternatives, there was no breach of fiduciary duty.
Perhaps the shareholder would have been more successful had he brought a
derivative action against the investment adviser for failure to disclose the
69
If
benefits the adviser had received as a result of give-ups he had directed.
the adviser received free services, ordinarily payable from his advisory fee,
the fund could be entitled to a refund. Failure to disclose this might be a
0
breach of the adviser's fiduciary duty"1
and of his duty to give the board of
7
directors all relevant information.1 1
On May 1, 1975, the minimum fixed commission rates were replaced by a
competitive rate system.' 7 2 Funds, through their advisers, can now negotiate
the commission rate with the broker and receive the appropriate discount
depending on the size of the transaction. In the past, the conflict of interest
was created because the adviser used the excess in the fixed commission rate
to purchase services other than execution, including investment research. 73 A
new conflict of interest has arisen with the advent of competitive commission
7 4
rates, since the adviser must determine what constitutes fair compensation. '
The problem for the investment adviser is whether, as a fiduciary, it aill
164. Id.
165. Id. at 750-52.
166. Id. at 752-55.
167. " 'Give-ups' were abolished by a rule of the NYSE effective December 5. 1968.
Recapture of commissions or a portion thereof, however, was permissible in other respects until
adoption of Article IX, Section 7(k) of the Constitution of the NYSE on January 29, 1973, and of
the present Rule 318 of the NYSE on February 1, 1973. Similar rules have now been adopted by
the AMEX and various regional exchanges." See Tannenbaum v. Zeller, 399 F. Supp. 945, 949
(S.D.N.Y. 1975).
168. Fogel v. Chestnutt, 533 F.2d 731 (2d Cir. 1975); Galfand v. Chestnutt, 402 F. Supp.
1318 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Tannenbaum v. Zeller, 399 F. Supp. 945 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
169. See Frankel v. Hyde [1973-1974 Transfer Binder], CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
94,486
(S.D.N.Y. 1974) (motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim denied).
170. See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(b) (1970).
171. See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-15(c) (1970).
172. SEC Reg. 19b-3(a), 17 C.F.R. § 240.19b-3(a) (1976).
173. Legislative History, supra note 103, at 239.
174. Legislative History, supra note 103, at 242-43. This problem is particularly acute when
the adviser controls the broker and as a result there is no arm's length negotiation possible on
commission rates.
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always be required to get the lowest commission rates for portfolio transactions. If so, it cannot use a broker who provides research services because the
charge would include research as well as execution costs. 17 5 The possibility
that the adviser would not be allowed to "pay-up" for research services caused
17 6
concern in the brokerage industry.
In response to this, Congress amended section 28 of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934.177 The new section 28(e)(1) provides that it is not a breach of
fiduciary duty for the investment adviser to pay excess commissions for
research services,' 7 8 if it determined in good faith that such a commission was
reasonable. The reasonableness would be determined by the value of the
brokerage and research services provided, viewed in terms of the particular
transaction or "the fiduciary's overall responsibilities with respect to the
accounts over which he exercises investment direction. It is thus unnecessary
for the money manager to show that specific services benefited specific
accounts. ' 179 The provisions are to supersede state common law or any other
federal or state law in effect at the time of the enactment of the 1975 Act.
It is also provided that the adviser must disclose the policies and practices
affecting the commission. The extent of the disclosure will be determined by
the appropriate regulatory agency. 80° The "standards [should] evolve in light
of the 'public interest and the protection of the investors.' "181
The result of this legislation is to allow the adviser to continue to "pay-up"
for additional research with brokerage commission dollars. Beyond the legal
questions involved there are practical considerations. The advisory fee is
based on providing portfolio management. If the fund pays excess brokerage
commissions for reseach, the fund is in essence paying for the same thing
twice. This double payment should be taken into consideration when the
adviser renegotiates its advisory fee.' 82
V.

CONCLUSION

With the passage of the Securities Acts Amendments, Congress has attempted to solve the problems arising from the unique relationship of the
investment adviser and the mutual fund. It is now clear that the owners of
175. Id. at 248; 1975 Hearings, supra note 75, at 202 (statement of Ray Garret, Jr.,
Chairman, SEC).
176. See, e.g., 1975 Hearings, supra note 75, at 285-91 (statement of Alliance One, Institutional Services, Inc.); id. at 295-97 (statement of the American Life Insurance Association).
177. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78bb (Supp. 1976).
178. Research services are defined in 15 U.S.C.A. § 78bb(e)(3) (Supp. 1976).
179. Legislative History, supra note 103, at 248.
180. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78bb(e)(2) (Supp. 1976).
181. Letter from Ray Garret, Jr., to Senator Harrison A. Williams, Jr., Sept. 12, 1975, in
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182. There also exist practical considerations for brokerage firms. A number of the larger
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the investment adviser are entitled to profit from the sale or transfer of the
adviser. However, Congress has been careful to establish safeguards to
protect the interest of the shareholders of the fund. Future litigation in this
area will certainly center on what constitutes an unfair burden on the fund.
The legislation leaves this term essentially undefined. However, any arrangement which entitles the new adviser to higher brokerage commissions than
were received by the old adviser places an unfair burden on the fund. The
type of compensation the new adviser may receive is limited by the new
provisions of the law. The courts must determine what constitutes bona fide
ordinary compensation; what are bona fide investment advisory services; and
what are the other services that the adviser can contract with the fund to
perform without placing an undue burden on the fund.
In determining the standards, courts should consider that Congress enacted
this legislation in reaction to court decisions that prohibited the retention of
profit by the owners of the adviser from its sale or transfer. Further, the
language of the new legislation appears to take a position allowing some
burden to be placed on the fund to facilitate the sale, in contrast to the
original proposals made by the SEC in 1966.
In the area of brokerage commissions, the new law expressly provides that
it is not a breach of the investment adviser's fiduciary duty to pay higher
commissions for stock execution. The adviser's conduct must, however, be
reasonable and he is under a duty to disclose fully his policies and practices
concerning the commission. This duty of full disclosure should allow the
independent members of the fund's board of directors to correctly evaluate the
services rendered by the adviser.
Howard Schiffman

